Download Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2016: 36th Annual by Matthew Robshaw, Jonathan Katz PDF

By Matthew Robshaw, Jonathan Katz

The 3 volume-set, LNCS 9814, LNCS 9815, and LNCS 9816, constitutes the refereed lawsuits of the thirty sixth Annual overseas Cryptology convention, CRYPTO 2016, held in Santa Barbara, CA, united states, in August 2016.

The 70 revised complete papers awarded have been rigorously reviewed and chosen from 274 submissions. The papers are geared up within the following topical sections: provable defense for symmetric cryptography; uneven cryptography and cryptanalysis; cryptography in conception and perform; compromised platforms; symmetric cryptanalysis; algorithmic quantity concept; symmetric primitives; uneven cryptography; symmetric cryptography; cryptanalytic instruments; hardware-oriented cryptography; safe computation and protocols; obfuscation; quantum recommendations; spooky encryption; IBE, ABE, and useful encryption; computerized instruments and synthesis; 0 wisdom; theory.

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Read or Download Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2016: 36th Annual International Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 14-18, 2016, Proceedings, Part II PDF

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Extra info for Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2016: 36th Annual International Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 14-18, 2016, Proceedings, Part II

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Key-Prefixed Schnorr signatures. After identifying the error in the GMLS proof, Bernstein [11] uses the lack of a tight security reduction for Schnorr’s signature scheme as a motivation to promote a “key-prefixed” modification to Schnorr’s signature scheme which includes the verifier’s public-key in the hash function. The EdDSA signature scheme by Bernstein et al. [12] is essentially a key-prefixing variant of Schnorr’s signature scheme. ” Indeed, Bernstein [11] proves that single-user security of the original 3 The main result of the published paper [23] even excludes reduction from any interactive assumption (with special algebraic properties), but the proof turned out to be flawed.

30 T. Yamakawa et al. Lemma 19. | Pr[T8 ] − Pr[T7 ]| is negligible. Proof. Since we have Pr[C ∗ ∈ S : C ∗ ← QRN ] ≤ 2−λ , in the following, we assume / S. Then there exists p¯ that divides ord(C ∗ ) but does not divide ord(S). C∗ ∈ (k) Let view be the view from A in Game 8 except K ∗ , and view := {P K, C ∗ , {xi,j mod ord(S)}i∈[λ],j∈[n],k∈{0,1} }. By a similar argument as in the proof of Claim 3, we have Δ((K ∗ , view), (U, view)) ≤ Δ((K ∗ , H, view ), (U, H, view )) and (t ) (t ) ˜ ∞ (C ∗ λi=1 xi,1i , .

Proof. Let q be an upper bound of the number of decryption queries A makes. We consider hybrids H0 , . . , Hq that are defined as follows. A hybrid H is the same as Game 6 except that the oracle to which A accesses works similarly as ODec for the first queries, and similarly as ODec for the rest of queries. Let T6, be the event that b = b holds in the hybrid H . Clearly, We have Pr[T6,0 ] = Pr[T6 ] and Pr[T6, ] = Pr[T7 ]. Let F be the event that ODec returns ⊥ for A’s -th query (C , pred ) but ODec does not return ⊥ for it.

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